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Abstract
Historically, people have often expressed negative feelings toward speculators, a 
sentiment that might have even been reinforced since the latest financial crisis, dur-
ing which taxpayer money was warranted or spent to bail out reckless investors. In 
this paper, we conjecture that judges may also have anti-speculator sentiment, which 
might affect their professional decision making. We asked 123 professional law-
yers and 247 law students in Germany this question, and they clearly predicted that 
judges would have an anti-speculator bias. However, in an actual behavioral study, 
185 judges did not exhibit such bias. In another sample of 170 professional lawyers, 
we found weak support for an anti-speculator bias. This evidence suggests that an 
independent audience may actually perceive unbiased judgments as biased. While 
the literature usually suggests that a communication problem exists between lawyers 
and non-lawyers (i.e. between judges and the general public), we find that this prob-
lem can also exist within the legal community.
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1 Introduction
Judges are supposed to decide cases solely on legal grounds (i.e. based on arguments 
the law deems relevant) and to disregard arguments that appeal to their personal 
moral, political, or philosophical standards but are irrelevant from a legal stand-
point. There is broad consensus among legal scholars, however, that judges do not 
always live up to those standards. Judges are, after all, human beings with emotions 
and moral and political convictions.
The suggestion that judges are not able to completely ignore emotionally appeal-
ing but legally irrelevant decision determinants is rather unsurprising from a psy-
chological standpoint. Judges often engage in what psychologists call “motivated 
reasoning” (Braman 2010; Kunda 1990; Sood 2013; Spellman and Schauer 2012). 
They want to convince their audience (e.g., individuals in the general public or the 
regulatory apparatus of the federal government, see Baum 2006; Black et al. 2016) 
and are focused on reaching certain conclusions. This motivation can affect judges’ 
information search and processing as well as other components of the decision-mak-
ing process. This same point finds support in psychological research on confirma-
tion bias (e.g., Snyder and Swann 1978).
However, judges are also professionals. They have been trained to distinguish 
legally relevant from legally irrelevant aspects of a case. Their job is to make deci-
sions on purely legal grounds, and many judges have been doing that for a very long 
time. In psychology, it is widely accepted that professional decision makers often 
perform much better at decision-making tasks than their non-professional counter-
parts. The question, therefore, is if and to what extent legal training, practice, and 
experience can insulate judges from the possibility of non-legal arguments influenc-
ing their decisions (Kahan et al. 2016; Spellman and Schauer 2012).
In this article, we provide evidence that judges’ decisions are not influenced by 
legally irrelevant sentiment toward speculators, even though we find that two inde-
pendent samples of 123 professional lawyers and 247 law students expect them to 
be biased against speculators. In another sample of 170 lawyers, we find weak evi-
dence for an anti-speculator bias. This adds to a growing body of literature that pos-
its that a biased audience may perceive unbiased judgments as biased. While this 
literature usually suggests that this “communication problem” exists between law-
yers and non-lawyers (i.e. between judges and the public), we show that a similar 
problem may exist within the legal community. Law students and professional law-
yers perceive judges to be biased, even though in our study the former are not biased 
themselves.
2  Previous literature
There is considerable empirical literature on legal decision making. However, many 
of the studies focus on how judges and juries find facts rather than how judges inter-
pret and apply statutes, doctrines, or precedents (e.g., Englich et al. 2006; Guthrie 
et al. 2001; Rachlinksi et al. 2009, 2013). Thus, these studies do not investigate the 
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aspect that is unique to legal decision making compared with other forms of profes-
sional decision making (Kahan 2015; Spellman and Schauer 2012).
Many studies on legal reasoning use non-professional decision makers as inform-
ants such as law students or even laypeople (e.g., Braman and Nelson 2007; Furge-
son et al. 2008a, b; Holyoak and Simon 1999; Simon et al. 2001). As such, they are 
of limited use because they do not reflect the professional part of judicial decision 
making (Kahan 2015; Kahan et al. 2016).
Empirical investigations of legal reasoning by professional judges can be divided 
into two groups (Kahan et al. 2016)—observational and experimental studies. The 
first group contains studies that use correlational analyses in the form of multivariate 
regression models. These studies usually treat legally irrelevant decision determi-
nants such as judges’ political ideology as one independent variable whose impact 
on the court’s decisions is assessed after controlling for other independent variables 
(e.g., Epstein et al. 2013; Segal et al. 2005; Sunstein et al. 2006). Ample evidence 
shows that political ideology affects judges in civil law countries. For example, 
Amaral-Garcia et al. (2009) investigate 270 constitutional court decisions from Por-
tugal and find that judges are sensitive to their political affiliations and their political 
party’s presence in government when voting. Espinosa (2017) analyzes 612 cases 
from the French Constitutional Council and also finds evidence of voting along 
political/ideological lines and that judges restrain themselves from invalidating laws. 
Berger and Neugart (2011) provide evidence for a nomination bias in German labor 
court activity—that is, courts are more active if unemployment rates are high.
The main advantage of these studies is that they investigate real decisions by sit-
ting judges made under real conditions. A larger methodological problem is that 
observational studies are necessarily limited to published judicial opinions. This 
leads to a sampling bias known as the “Priest–Klein” hypothesis (Priest and Klein 
1984). It is fair to assume that parties are less likely to litigate disputes if they fear 
that a favorable outcome is highly improbable. In the literature, these cases are 
called “easy cases” because they do not involve much legal ambiguity and uncer-
tainty. Those cases will either be settled or not be filed. Consequently, any sample of 
published decisions will contain a disproportionately high number of “hard cases” 
(i.e. cases in which legal ambiguity and uncertainty is high). This is why any inves-
tigation limited to published opinions will understate the influence of legally rel-
evant arguments that steer cases away from litigation and, on the flipside, is likely 
to overstate the impact of legally irrelevant determinants (Kahan et  al. 2016). In 
other words, because hard cases involve more legal ambiguity than easy cases, they 
are more likely to be decided on the grounds of non-legal arguments disguised as 
legal reasoning. Any study using a sample that contains a disproportionate number 
of hard cases is therefore likely to overstate the influence of non-legal factors on 
judicial decision making (Spellman and Schauer 2012).
Experimental studies avoid this methodological problem. Moreover, they allow 
studying judicial decision making in a more controlled environment, though this 
artificiality is also a disadvantage of experimental studies, raising questions par-
ticularly about the external validity of results. Overall, however, we believe that the 
benefits of experimental designs outweigh their disadvantages and therefore are the 
more promising approach (see Kahan et al. 2016; Sood 2013).
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We find only a few experimental studies on legal reasoning by real judges:
• Wistrich et  al. (2015) use a between-subjects design to assess whether U.S. 
judges (state and federal, trial and appellate; n > 1800) are more likely to favor 
parties displayed as likable or sympathetic over parties displayed as dislikable 
or unsympathetic, even though these features have no legal relevance. They cre-
ated two or more versions of various hypothetical civil and criminal law cases, 
encompassing a wide range of legal reasoning tasks, such as interpreting and 
applying the law, exercising discretion, and awarding damages. They varied the 
information that made the parties seem either sympathetic or unsympathetic. 
This information was irrelevant from a legal standpoint.1 Nevertheless, Wistrich 
et al. (2015) found that judges favored sympathetic parties over unsympathetic 
parties in all hypothetical cases and, in some cases, to a large extent. They found 
no evidence that judges’ decisions at the trial level were driven by political ideol-
ogy.
• Kahan et al. (2016) use a similar method to assess whether U.S. state trial and 
appellate judges’ (n = 253) cultural worldviews influenced their decisions. They 
found that, though judges were polarized on topics such as climate change 
and marijuana legalization, these differences had no effect on their legal judg-
ments. Their decisions did however concretely influence their assessments out-
side the legal realm: a non-legal risk assessment task that Kahan et  al. (2016) 
also assigned to the judges. Furthermore, with regard to legal reasoning, judges 
performed much better (i.e. were less influenced by their cultural outlooks) than 
a sample of law students (n = 284) but not significantly better than a sample of 
lawyers (n = 217). Kahan et al. (2016) therefore conclude that professional judg-
ment imparted by legal training and experience confers resistance to identity-
protective cognition, but only for decisions involving legal reasoning. This result 
is in line with that of Redding and Repucci (1999).
• Spamann and Klöhn (2016) created a virtual file of an international criminal law 
appeal case with briefs, precedents, and a trial judgment displayed on a tablet 
computer. They gave a group of 32 U.S. federal judges 55 min to read the file and 
decide the case. In addition, they asked judges to briefly state reasons for their 
decisions in writing. They used a 2 × 2 between-subjects design to determine 
what had a stronger impact on the judges’ decisions: a weak, distinguishable 
precedent or legally irrelevant information about the likability of the defendant. 
They found that the weak precedent had no measureable effect while the legally 
irrelevant information about the defendant shifted the probability of conviction 
by 45 percentage points.
In summary, the question whether judges’ professionalism shields them from the 
influence of legally irrelevant decision determinants is far from answered. While 
Kahan et al. (2016) provide evidence that gives reason for optimism, the results of 
1 There is some doubt about whether this applied to all hypothetical cases (see Kahan et al. 2016; Wis-
trich et al. 2015).
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Wistrich et al.’s (2015) and Spamann and Klöhn’s (2016) studies are rather sobering. 
We add to this literature by providing another piece of evidence largely in line with 
Kahan et al. (2016).
3  The anti‑speculation sentiment in the German judiciary
Drawing on our scientific experience with investor and securities litigation in Ger-
many, we argue that judges hold sentiment against capital market speculation and 
speculators in the German judiciary. To be sure, speculators have always had a 
rather negative image in most, if not all, countries of the world. They have been 
labeled gamblers or parasites who got rich without working for their money and 
have been blamed for impoverishing others, causing financial crises, and inflicting 
harm on society (Fabian 1990). We hypothesize, however, that the anti-speculation 
sentiment is particularly strong in Germany and that it affects the German judiciary 
and legal training as well. Several practicing lawyers told us that defendants (e.g. 
banks, brokers, investment firms) win their cases against investor-plaintiffs if they 
can convince the judge that the plaintiff was a reckless speculator. Even if the court 
does not dismiss the claim right away, it will exercise its discretion in favor of the 
defendant (e.g. in the context of measuring damage or finding contributory negli-
gence). We therefore conjecture:
H1 There is a perceived bias in judicial decision making. Professional lawyers and 
law students predict that judges will more frequently and more severely punish spec-
ulators than other defendants in cases in which the quality as speculator has no legal 
relevance.
These anecdotes find support in the reasoning of some published decisions by 
German courts. While the economic literature defines a speculator neutrally as a 
profit-motivated trader who tries to exploit differences in prices (see Harris 2002), 
some German courts have equated being a speculator with being irrational, manipu-
lating, reckless, and even less worthy of legal protection. For example, German law 
makes inducing other people to speculate on stock exchanges a criminal act if the 
person doing the inducing is taking advantage of other people’s inexperience (§§ 26, 
51 Stock Exchange Act). The Federal Court of Justice has stated that the rationale 
of this provision is not only to protect the economic interest of inexperienced inves-
tors but also to prevent the “distortive effect of speculative trades” on stock prices.2 
In another quite prominent example, the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart (OLG 
Stuttgart) wrote in one of its judgments on the landmark Markus Geltl. v. Daimler 
AG case3 that the reasonable investor—a legal standard used to determine whether a 
2 Bundesgerichtshof 7.12.1979—2 StR 315/79 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1980, p. 1007 sub B I. 
(quoting a judgment by the Imperial Court and legislative material).
3 Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart 22.4.2009—20 Kap 1/08 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 2009, p. 
624, 628 (DaimlerChrysler II).
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piece of information is material4—acted “rationally” and made decisions “contrary to 
the speculative investor” on reliable factual grounds. Contrast this with what the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote in 1968 about the reasonable investor 
in its famous judgment Securities & Exchange Com. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.: “The 
speculators and chartists of Wall Street and Bay Street are also ‘reasonable’ investors 
entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders”.5 Given the con-
trasting picture of speculators among the Germany judiciary, we hypothesize:
H2 There is an anti-speculator bias in judicial decision making. Judges more fre-
quently and more severely punish speculators than other defendants in cases in 
which the quality as speculator has no legal relevance.
Here, we do not claim that the negative connotation of speculation and specu-
lators in these judgments is per se “wrong” from a legal perspective (though we 
believe that in some cases, such as the case of OLG Stuttgart, it clearly was wrong). 
Furthermore, it is not our intent to get into an economic debate about the positive 
and negative externalities of speculation and whether speculation should be con-
tained or encouraged from a social welfare perspective (see Kemp and Sinn 2000; 
Stevens 1892). We are, however, confident that the anti-speculation sentiment 
among German judges is likely to have an effect on decisions in cases in which it 
clearly should not guide judges’ decisions from a legal standpoint.
Finally, we were interested in how well lawyers would predict the frequency and 
extent of contributory negligence in the treatment condition. In Germany, legal edu-
cation follows the concept of “uniform lawyer education” (einheitliche Juristenaus-
bildung). This means that anyone who aspires to go into the legal profession must 
undergo the same legal training. This education consists of legal studies for at least 
4  years at a university and 2  years of practical training in a court, administrative 
body, and law firm. The focal point of the education is the qualification for judge-
ship (Befähigung zum Richteramt). Thus, law students in Germany are trained not 
merely to “think like a lawyer” but to think like a judge. Therefore, we were optimis-
tic that lawyers would accurately predict whether and to what extent judges would 
award contributory negligence.
H3 Lawyers and law students will accurately predict how frequently and to what 
extent judges award contributory negligence in the treatment condition.
4 Expected to have an impact on the price of the security.
5 Securities & Exchange Com. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
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4  Method
4.1  Behavioral study
4.1.1  The cases
In line with Wistrich et al. (2015) and Kahan et al. (2016), who distributed short case 
vignettes to their participants and asked them to solve the cases in a relatively short 
period, we created three hypothetical cases using a paper-and-pencil research design. All 
three cases were civil law cases. One case had no relation to the world of investing, while 
two cases centered on questions of investor protection. In each case, the protagonist had 
a damage claim against another person, and we asked the participants whether this dam-
age claim should be reduced due to contributory negligence. We created two versions 
of each case. In one version (the “treatment condition”), the case involved a specula-
tor (i.e. a person whose goal is to earn money in a relatively short period by betting on 
the development of security prices). In the other version (the “control condition”), the 
case involved another person such as a doctor, an inventor, or a long-term investor, or 
an inventor. In each case, the varied information had no legal relevance. Thus, from a 
purely legal perspective both versions of the case were essentially the same. Table 3 in 
the “Appendix” provides the original full text and the English translation.
The three cases also differed in terms of their legal ambiguity. In case 1, there 
was no “one right answer”, so we refer to this case as a “hard case” (for a distinc-
tion between “hard” and “easy” cases in legal decision making, see Spellman and 
Schauer 2012). In a previous article, one of the authors submitted this case (involving 
no speculator) to various groups of participants, ranging from first-year law students 
to senior law students and sitting judges (Klöhn and Stephan 2010). On average, all 
groups of participants found 50% contributory negligence regardless of their legal 
expertise and experience. Thus, we predicted that 50% of our participants would find 
contributory negligence in both the treatment and control conditions if participants 
were not biased against or in favor of speculators. Cases 2 and 3 are easier cases. 
Under German law, contributory negligence requires that there be a breach of “duty 
to act diligently in one’s own affairs” (Sorgfalt in eigenen Angelegenheiten). Cases 2 
and 3 have no information that could serve as grounds for such charge. To find con-
tributory negligence, one would need to qualify the investment decision itself as a 
breach of duty. However, there is no information about why this decision might have 
been taken carelessly. Thus, we predicted that none of the participants would find 
contributory negligence in either the control condition or the treatment condition of 
case 2 and case 3 if participants were not biased against or in favor of speculators.
4.1.2  Participants
For legal case 1, we targeted 80 participants from each of the three cohorts. For 
the legal cases 2 and 3, we targeted 50 participants for each case. We admin-
istered the experiment to 614 participants (185 judges, 170 lawyers, and 259 
students). Two lawyers and one student did not solve the legal case that was 
 European Journal of Law and Economics
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Table 1  Summary statistics
Mean Median SD Min Max Contributory 
negligence
N
Behavioral study Yes
Judge sample
 Contributory negligence 0.33 0 0.47 0 1 185
 Extent contributory negligence 0.38 0.30 0.24 0.08 1 60
 Gender 0.45 0 0.50 0 1 183
 Age 48.12 46 9.03 33 67 178
 Living standard 2.50 2 0.64 0 5 181
 Earnings 3.69 4 0.70 0 5 176
 Political orientation 4.99 5 1.64 1 9 180
 Trust 0.34 0 0.48 0 1 169
Lawyer sample
 Contributory negligence 0.24 0 0.43 0 1 168
 Extent contributory negligence 0.41 0.32 0.25 0.05 1 40
 Gender 0.25 0 0.43 0 1 170
 Age 37.84 35 7.79 24 67 166
 Living standard 2.12 2 0.60 0 4 169
 Earnings 4.19 4 0.71 1 5 168
 Political orientation 5.88 6 1.46 2 9 165
 Trust 0.33 0 0.47 0 1 165
Student sample
 Contributory negligence 0.35 0 0.48 0 1 258
 Extent contributory negligence 0.35 0.30 0.22 0.02 1 84
 Gender 0.61 1 0.49 0 1 258
 Age 24.79 24 2.05 22 47 256
 Living standard 2.43 2 0.61 1 5 253
 Earnings 3.39 3 0.76 1 5 252
 Political orientation 5.38 6.5 1.51 1 10 236
 Trust 0.58 1 0.49 0 1 249
Prediction study
Lawyer sample
 Contributory negligence 0.32 0.30 0.26 0 1 123
 Extent contributory negligence 0.29 0.25 0.16 0.05 1 112
 Gender 0.29 0 0.45 0 1 105
 Age 38.63 35 8.92 27 75 104
 Political orientation 5.60 6 1.27 3 8 101
 Trust 0.49 0 0.50 0 1 99
Student sample
 Contributory negligence 0.36 0.30 0.24 0 0.9 247
 Extent contributory negligence 0.33 0.30 0.20 0.05 1 224
 Gender 0.54 1 0.49 0 1 247
 Age 19.99 19 2.62 17 43 247
 Political orientation 4.42 4 1.62 1 9 240
 Trust 0.53 1 0.50 0 1 240
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part of the experiment and were subsequently exclude from the analysis. Moreo-
ver, response rates to the survey questions varied, so the regression results are 
based on a somewhat smaller sample. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of 
the sample.
4.1.3  Survey questions
After solving one of the cases, all participants had to answer a survey on the back 
of the sheet of paper that was allocated to them. In terms of demographics, we 
were interested in participants’ gender, age, place of birth, living standard (“What 
describes your standard of living?” 1 = “very well off”, 6 = “poor”), relative earn-
ings (“Compared to other households, would you say your household earns less or 
more money?” 0 = “far less money”, 5 = “far more money”), political orientation 
(“In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place 
your views on this scale, generally speaking?” 0 = “left”, 10 = “right”), and lack of 
trust (“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 0 = “most people can be trusted”, 
1 = “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”). We adapted the trust question 
from the World Value Survey, which has been used widely in studies comparing lev-
els of generalized trust. We adapted all other questions from Ariely et al. (2019) and 
Mann et al. (2016). Materials were almost identical in the three settings, with the 
main exception being that judges were asked additional details about their position 
in the judiciary and cognizance, lawyers about their position in the law firm and the 
field of law they specialized in, and students about their major field of law study and 
their grades in the civil law, criminal law, and public law intermediate examination.
4.1.4  Administration and procedure
For the judge and student samples, the study was administered over a four-month 
period from August to November 2013. For the lawyer sample, it took us an addi-
tional 8  months to reach the targeted sample size. To ensure consistency in the 
administration, an experimenter traveled to the respective location where the experi-
ment took place. Judges were recruited during training at the German Judicial 
Academy (Deutsche Richterakademie), Germany’s leading institution for training 
judges. For the experiment, we recruited judges attending eight different seminars 
on building law, child custody, asylum law, social justice, organized crime, civil law, 
criminal economic offences, and procedural law at the Academy centers in Trier and 
Wustrau. The judges had to solve one of three cases without any preparation or addi-
tional material. We recruited the lawyer sample from 11 mid-size and large Ger-
man and international law firms. The experiment was administered in their offices in 
Berlin, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Munich. Finally, we recruited the student sample 
from the advanced corporate law class (Unternehmens und Gesellschaftsrecht) at the 
University of Munich; the experiment took place in a lecture hall.
In each case, the experimenter described the study and indicated that participants 
should complete the study by themselves without exchanging information with their 
 European Journal of Law and Economics
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peers. This policy was enforced by the experimenter administering the experiment. 
The participants were informed that they would have approximately 10–15  min 
to complete the study. We deliberately decided not to compensation participants 
because an insufficient financial payment might have offended the professional sense 
of honor of judges and lawyers.
4.2  Prediction study
4.2.1  Participants
We recruited two separate samples of participants to predict the decisions of the 
judges for the different cases. The participants in the first sample were, as before, 
recruited from large German and international law firms based in Germany. Over-
all, 123 lawyers participated in the prediction study. The participants in the second 
sample were law students from Free University of Berlin and Humboldt University 
of Berlin. Overall, 247 law students participated in the prediction study. All par-
ticipants predicted the outcome of one of the three legal cases for the treatment and 
control groups. The cases were distributed to them at random. In terms of politi-
cal orientation, the lawyer predictors were slightly to the right of the 10-point scale 
(value 0.56); 49% stated that people can generally be trusted, while 51% stated the 
opposite. Approximately one-third of the participants were women, and the average 
age was 39 years. The median law student predictor was younger, more to the left in 
terms of political orientation, more trusting, and female. Table 1 provides descrip-
tive statistics of the predictor samples.
4.2.2  Survey and procedure
Participants of the prediction study were informed that they would be learning about 
an experiment that was conducted with German judges and that they would be mak-
ing predictions about the judges’ decisions. The details of one of the cases were 
explained to them, with the differences in the respective treatment and control group 
clearly highlighted. The predictors were then asked to estimate (1) the percent-
age of judges who awarded contributory negligence for the treatment and control 
groups, respectively, and (2) the extent to which these judges awarded contributory 
negligence.
5  Results
5.1  Prediction study
In line with H1, we first analyze whether there is a perceived bias in judicial deci-
sion making. Our analyses reveal that lawyers and law students predicted such a bias 
on two dimensions. For legal case 1 (lawyers: 37 vs. 48%, p = 0.049; students: 25 
vs. 41%, p < 0.001), legal case 2 (lawyers: 13 vs. 37%, p < 0.001; students: 26 vs. 
1 3
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44%, p < 0.001), and legal case 3 (lawyers: 19 vs. 35%, p = 0.001; students: 34 vs. 
47%, p < 0.001), lawyers and law students predicted that speculators would more 
frequently receive a punishment (see Figs. 1 and 2). Moreover, the lawyers predicted 
not only that more judges would award contributory negligence if a speculator was 
37% 48% 13% 38% 19% 35%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Control 
N=43
Treatment 
N=43
Control 
N=38
Treatment 
N=38
Control 
N=42
Treatment 
N=41
Case 1: Person Case 2: Purpose Case 3: Source
p=0.049 p<0.001 p=0.001
Fig. 1  Prediction study lawyers: Percentage of judges awarding contributory negligence. Note: Spikes 
indicate ± 1 standard error. The test used is a group-mean comparison t test
25% 41% 26% 44% 34% 47%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Control
N=83
Treatment
N=83
Control
N=85
Treatment
N=85
Control
N=79
Treatment
N=79
Case 1: Person Case 2: Purpose Case 3: Source
p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001
Fig. 2  Prediction study law students: Percentage of judges awarding contributory negligence. Note: 
Spikes indicate ± 1 standard error. The test used is a group-mean comparison t-test
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involved but also that the contributory negligence awarded would be significantly 
higher in the treatment group. For legal case 1 (lawyers: 25 vs. 36%, p < 0.001; stu-
dents: 27 vs. 40%, p < 0.001), legal case 2 (lawyers: 18 vs. 38%, p < 0.001; students: 
24 vs. 38%, p < 0.001), and legal case 3 (lawyers: 19 vs. 34%, p < 0.001; students: 27 
25% 36% 18% 38% 19% 34%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Control
N=42
Treatment
N=42
Control
N=30
Treatment
N=37
Control
N=37
Treatment
N=38
Case 1: Person Case 2: Purpose Case 3: Source
p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001
Fig. 3  Prediction study lawyers: Percentage of contributory negligence by judges awarded. Note: Spikes 
indicate ± 1 standard error. The test used is a group-mean comparison t-test
27% 40% 24% 38% 27% 40%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Control
N=70
Treatment
N=79
Control
N=78
Treatment
N=82
Control
N=72
Treatment
N=74
Case 1: Person Case 2: Purpose Case 3: Source
p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001
Fig. 4  Prediction study law students: Percentage of contributory negligence by judges awarded. Note: 
Spikes indicate ± 1 standard error. The test used is a group-mean comparison t-test
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vs. 40%, p < 0.001), the cohorts expected speculators to be punished more severely 
(see Figs. 3 and 4). These findings provide robust evidence for H1 that professional 
lawyers and law students believe that judges might have a bias against speculators 
and potentially against the financial industry more generally.6 To determine whether 
this is indeed the case, we now turn to the analysis of the behavioral study and the 
judge sample.
5.2  Behavioral study
In a second step, we investigate whether judges are affected by the person who might 
act negligently (see Fig. 5). We find that in legal case 1, judges awarded contributory 
negligence slightly more often when a doctor rather than a speculator was involved. 
However, this difference is not statistically significant (63 vs. 50%, p = 0.239). 
When manipulating the purpose of the investment or the source of the funds, we 
find similar results. While for legal case 2 contributory negligence is awarded more 
frequently for the control group (24 vs. 12%, p = 0.279), in legal case 3 specula-
tors are awarded contributory negligence more often, though this difference is not 
statistically significant (4 vs. 12%, p = 0.307). Regarding the extent of contributory 
negligence awarded, the judgments did not differ for the doctor or speculator in legal 
case 1 (36 vs. 38%, p = 0.718). Given that only a few judges awarded contributory 
negligence at all in legal cases 2 and 3, we can draw no meaningful comparison 
63% 50% 24% 12%
4%
12%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Control
N=43
Treatment
N=42
Control
N=25
Treatment
N=25
Control
N=25
Treatment
N=25
Case 1: Person Case 2: Purpose Case 3: Source
p=0.239 p=0.279 p=0.307
Fig. 5  Behavioral study: Judges. Note: Spikes indicate ± 1 standard error. The test used is a group-mean 
comparison t-test
6 The magnitude of the predicted bias is not significantly different for the lawyer and law student predic-
tors.
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regarding the extent of contributory negligence awarded. Thus, our data provide no 
support for H2.
One explanation for why judges were not affected by the person acting negli-
gently could be that the manipulation was too salient and the cases were easy to 
decide. First, judges only saw one condition—treatment or control condition—and it 
is highly unlikely that they inferred the manipulation by simply reviewing the case. 
Second, Danzinger et al. (2011) show not only that judges apply legal reasoning to 
the facts in a rational, mechanical, and deliberative manner but also that psycho-
logical, political, and social factors affect their rulings. Especially the latest financial 
crisis might have triggered anti-speculator sentiments among certain social groups 
(e.g. judges). Third, if our manipulation was too obvious and, for that reason, the 
person acting negligently did not exert any effect on legal reasoning, the outcome 
of our study should not differ for the hard and easy cases. However, we find strong 
differences between the two types of cases (see Fig. 5); this gives us confidence that 
our results are not driven merely by the nature of the three cases we developed.
To test H3, we compare the results from the prediction study with the actual 
outcomes of the behavioral study (see Figs.  6, 7). For the treatment condition of 
legal case 1, we find that lawyers quite accurately predicted the percentage of judges 
awarding contributory negligence (50 vs. 48%, p = 0.852). However, for the other 
two cases, in which contributory negligence should not be awarded, lawyers pre-
dicted a significantly higher failure rate in judicial decision making. In legal case 
2 (12 vs. 38%, p < 0.001) and legal case 3 (12 vs. 35%, p = 0.002), they predicted 
that judges would award contributory negligence three time more frequently as they 
actually did in the behavioral study. The results for the student sample are similar, 
with law students deviating even more strongly from the actual outcomes of the 
50% 48% 12% 38% 12% 35%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Judgement
N=42
Prediction
N=43
Judgement
N=25
Prediction
N=38
Judgement
N=25
Prediction
N=41
Case 1: Person Case 2: Purpose Case 3: Source
p=0.852 p<0.001 p=0.002
Fig. 6  Prediction study (lawyers) versus behavioral study (treatment group). Note: Spikes indicate ± 1 
standard error. The test used is a group-mean comparison t-test
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behavioral study for all three cases. When considering the extent of contributory 
negligence in the treatment condition of legal case 1, the contributory negligence 
awarded was only marginally higher than what lawyers predicted (38 vs. 36%, 
p = 0.593), which is in line with H3. Again, for the other two legal cases too few 
judges awarded contributory negligence, so we make no meaningful comparison 
regarding the extent of contributory negligence between the behavioral and the pre-
diction study. Overall, the evidence for H3 is mixed, with especially lawyers predict-
ing the frequency and extent to which judges award contributory negligence in the 
treatment condition quite accurately for the hard case 1, but lawyers and law stu-
dents performing rather poorly for the easy cases 2 and 3.
5.3  Supplementary results
In a next step, we investigate whether lawyers or law students exhibit a bias 
toward speculators. If so, this would count as evidence that judges learn to bet-
ter control their biases. The evidence shows, however, that neither lawyers nor 
students exhibit a significant anti-speculator bias (see Figs. 8, 9, respectively). As 
this result might be due to the small sample size in the respective cases, we also 
combined the three cases for the different cohorts. However, we found no signifi-
cant difference between the lawyer sample (20 vs. 27%, p = 0.320) and the student 
sample (37 vs. 33%, p = 0.549).
In a final step, we investigate whether there is a learning effect in the judici-
ary. If legal training has a positive effect on judicial decision making, we would 
50% 41% 12% 44% 12% 47%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Judgement
N=42
Prediction
N=83
Judgement
N=25
Prediction
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Judgement
N=25
Prediction
N=79
Case 1: Person Case 2: Purpose Case 3: Source
p=0.183 p<0.001 p<0.001
Fig. 7  Prediction study (law students) versus behavioral study (treatment group). Note: Spikes indi-
cate ± 1 standard error. The test used is a group-mean comparison t-test
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expect that in legal cases 2 and 3, judges and lawyers would award contributory 
negligence less often than students, who can still be considered judicial laypeo-
ple. The effect of legal training might even be more pronounced because only the 
smartest students finish university with a law degree and become lawyers or even 
41% 52% 7% 14% 12% 14%
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Case 1: Person Case 2: Purpose Case 3: Source
p=0.439 p=0.397 p=0.769
Fig. 8  Behavioral study: Lawyers. Note: Spikes indicate ± 1 standard error. The test used is a group-mean 
comparison t-test
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Fig. 9  Behavioral Study: Students. Note: Spikes indicate ± 1 standard error. The test used is a group-
mean comparison t-test
1 3
European Journal of Law and Economics 
judges. Thus, some of the students in our sample might be considered advanced 
laypeople, because they will not finish their law degree and will take a job outside 
the judiciary. To investigate the effect of learning and selection, we combined the 
treatment and control conditions and investigated how often the different cohorts 
awarded contributory negligence. For the two “easy cases”, we observe that 
judges and lawyers did not differ in the frequency of how often they awarded con-
tributory negligence (13 vs. 12%, p = 1.000). However, students awarded contrib-
utory negligence significantly more often than judges (26 vs. 13%, p = 0.017) and 
significantly more often than lawyers (26 vs. 12%, p = 0.006) (see Fig. 10). Thus, 
legal training seems to improve participants’ ability to ignore irrelevant facts.
To control for confounding variables, we run a Probit regression. Our depend-
ent variable is the decision of a participant to award contributory negligence 
or not. For all the regressions reported in Table 2, we calculate robust standard 
errors and report average marginal effects. Table 4 in the “Appendix” provides a 
full description of the explanatory variables. To identify the effect of our treat-
ment condition, we first include a dummy variable speculator dummy that is equal 
to 1 if the respective participant received the treatment condition and 0 otherwise. 
When pooling the different cohorts (columns 1 and 2), we again do not find any 
evidence of a speculator bias, neither for the “hard case” nor for the two “easy 
cases”. However, when investigating the different cohorts individually (columns 
3–8), we find some evidence for the “easy cases” that lawyers—after having pre-
dicted a speculator bias for the judges—suffer from an anti-speculator bias. How-
ever, this finding is only weakly significant at the 10% level.
56%
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Fig. 10  Percentage of participants awarding contributory negligence (treatment and control group 
combined). p values of Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for legal cases 2 and 3: Lawyers − Judges: 
Diff. = − 1.2%, p = 1.000; Students − Judges: Diff. = 13.5%, p = 0.017; Students − Lawyers: Diff. = 14.7%, 
p = 0.006
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Moreover, we find robust evidence that participants’ distrust increases the likeli-
hood that they award contributory negligence in the “hard case”, which is driven 
mostly by the judge and student cohorts but not the lawyer cohort. Finally, we find 
evidence that younger lawyers more often award contributory negligence in the 
“easy cases”. For these two cases, both the living standard and household income 
play a relevant role for awarding contributory negligence, particularly in the lawyer 
and judge cohorts.
As a robustness test, we estimated all models with ordinary least squares and 
found similar results to those in the Probit regressions.7
6  Conclusion
In this study, we investigated whether sitting judges disfavor speculators over other 
professions in cases in which the quality as speculator has no legal relevance. Two 
samples of 123 professional lawyers and 247 law students predicted that judges 
would hold biases against speculators. Our behavioral study, however, reveals no 
such bias. This result is in line with recent literature that posits that judges’ profes-
sionalism shields them from the influence of legally irrelevant decision determinants. 
The discrepancy between the lawyers’ predictions and the judges’ actual behavior is 
in line with a view recently expressed in the literature that a biased audience may 
perceive unbiased judgments as biased (Kahan 2011). In our study, law students and 
professional lawyers wrongly predicted that judges would be biased, though we find 
no or only weak evidence that law students and lawyers are biased themselves.
Our study also has clear limitations. While experimental studies enable the exper-
imenter to better control for confounding variables, they also come with some disad-
vantages. Unlike in observational studies, judges’ decisions did not have any impact 
on people’s lives in our experiment. Arguably, if they would have, judges might have 
decided even more carefully, and observing a bias in the behavioral study might 
have been even less likely. Nevertheless, future research might investigate potential 
biases of judges using real cases in which judges’ decisions have an impact on actual 
people. Interviews and prediction studies among lawyers might be novel ways to 
guide researchers on testing these biases.
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Appendix
See Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3  Legal cases (German)
Case 1 “Person”: control condition
Der Arzt A wohnt seit drei Monaten neben seiner Nachbarin N und deren vier Jahre alter Katze „Sch-
neeflöckchen“. Als A von N zum ersten Mal zum Abendessen eingeladen wird und A gedankenverloren 
von seiner Tochter erzählt, streichelt A—ebenfalls zum ersten Mal—Schneeflöckchen und wird prompt 
von ihr gebissen. Mitverschulden des A?
Case 1 “Person”: treatment condition
Der Börsenhändler B wohnt seit drei Monaten neben seiner Nachbarin N und deren vier Jahre alter Katze 
„Schneeflöckchen“. Als B von N zum ersten Mal zum Abendessen eingeladen wird und gedankenver-
loren von seinen erfolgreichen Handelsstrategien berichtet, streichelt B—ebenfalls zum ersten Mal—
Schneeflöckchen und wird prompt von ihr gebissen. Mitverschulden des B?
Case 2 “Purpose of Investment”: control condition
Zur Altersvorsorge möchte Anleger A 10% seines Vermögens in den Rohstoff-Fonds R investieren. Nach-
dem er den Fonds gezeichnet hat, werden in Sibirien unerwartet reichhaltige Edelmetallvorkommen 
erschlossen. Aus diesem Grund sinkt der Wert der R-Fondsanteile um 50%. Es stellt sich heraus, dass 
die B-Bank vergaß, A darüber aufzuklären, dass sie von dem Anbieter des R-Fonds Rückvergütungen in 
Höhe von 8% der Zeichnungssumme erhalten habe und dass A aus diesem Grund—was zutrifft—einen 
Anspruch auf Schadensersatz habe. Ist dieser Anspruch wegen Mitverschuldens zu kürzen. Falls ja, wie 
hoch ist der Mitverschuldensanteil des A in Prozent?
Case 2 “Purpose of Investment”: treatment condition
Um von kurzfristigen Kursschwankungen zu profitieren, möchte Spekulant S 10% seines Vermögens in 
den Rohstoff-Fonds R investieren. Nachdem er den Fonds gezeichnet hat, werden in Sibirien unerwartet 
reichhaltige Edelmetallvorkommen erschlossen. Aus diesem Grund sinkt der Wert der R-Fondsanteile 
um 50%. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die B-Bank vergaß, S darüber aufzuklären, dass sie von dem Anbi-
eter des R-Fonds Rückvergütungen in Höhe von 8% der Zeichnungssumme erhalten habe und dass S 
aus diesem Grund—was zutrifft—einen Anspruch auf Schadensersatz habe. Ist dieser Anspruch wegen 
Mitverschuldens zu kürzen. Falls ja, wie hoch ist der Mitverschuldensanteil des S in Prozent?
Case 3 “Source of Funds”: control condition
Der Tüftler T hat jahrelang an einer Erfindung geforscht, die es unterschiedlichen Regierungen nun-
mehr ermöglicht, die Ozeane kostengünstig und umweltverträglich von Plastikmüll zu befreien. Die 
Erfindung ist so gut, dass er bereits 10 Millionen Euro verdient hat. T möchte 10% des neu verdienten 
Vermögens in den Rohstoff-Fonds R investieren. Nachdem er den Fonds gezeichnet hat, werden in 
Sibirien unerwartet reichhaltige Edelmetallvorkommen erschlossen. Aus diesem Grund sinkt der Wert 
der R-Fondsanteile um 50%. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die B-Bank vergaß, T darüber aufzuklären, dass 
sie von dem Anbieter des R-Fonds Rückvergütungen in Höhe von 8% der Zeichnungssumme erhalten 
habe und dass T aus diesem Grund—was zutrifft—einen Anspruch auf Schadensersatz habe. Ist dieser 
Anspruch wegen Mitverschuldens zu kürzen. Falls ja, wie hoch ist der Mitverschuldensanteil des T in 
Prozent?
Case 3 “Source of Funds”: treatment condition
Der Spekulant S hat mit einer neuen Handelsstrategie kürzlich 10 Millionen Euro verdient. S möchte 
10% des neu verdienten Vermögens in den Rohstoff-Fonds R investieren. Nachdem er den Fonds 
gezeichnet hat, werden in Sibirien unerwartet reichhaltige Edelmetallvorkommen erschlossen. Aus 
diesem Grund sinkt der Wert der R-Fondsanteile um 50%. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die B-Bank ver-
gaß, S darüber aufzuklären, dass sie von dem Anbieter des R-Fonds Rückvergütungen in Höhe von 8% 
der Zeichnungssumme erhalten habe und dass S aus diesem Grund—was zutrifft—einen Anspruch auf 
Schadensersatz habe. Ist dieser Anspruch wegen Mitverschuldens zu kürzen. Falls ja, wie hoch ist der 
Mitverschuldensanteil des S in Prozent?
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Table 3  (continued)
Legal cases (English translation)
Case 1 “Person”: control condition
Doctor A has been living next to neighbor N and her 4-year-old cat “snowflake” for three months. When 
A is invited over for dinner for the first time, A contemplatively tells N about his daughter while petting 
snowflake—also for the first time—and is promptly bitten. A can claim damages from N. Is this claim 
to be reduced due to contributory negligence? If yes, by how much should A’s claim be reduced (as a 
percentage)?
Case 1 “Person”: treatment condition
Speculator B has been living next to neighbor N and her 4-year-old cat “snowflake” for three months. 
When B is invited over for dinner for the first time, B contemplatively tells N about his new profitable 
trading strategy while petting snowflake—also for the first time—and is promptly bitten. B can claim 
damages from N. Is this claim to be reduced due to contributory negligence? If yes, by how much 
should B’s claim be reduced (as a percentage)?
Case 2 “Purpose of Investment”: control condition
For retirement, the 30-year-old investor A invests 10% of his assets in commodities fund R. After 
subscribing to the fund, vast precious metal sources are unexpectedly found in Siberia. This causes the 
value of the R-Fund to drop by 50%. B-bank forgot to disclose to A that it had received kickback pay-
ments of 8% of the subscription amount from and that A therefore has a damages claim against B-bank 
(which is true). Is this claim to be reduced due to contributory negligence? If yes, by how much should 
A’s claim be reduced (as a percentage)?
Case 2 “Purpose of Investment”: treatment condition
To profit from short-term price fluctuations, the 30-year-old speculator S invests 10% of his assets in 
commodities fund R. After subscribing to the fund, vast precious metal sources are unexpectedly found 
in Siberia. This causes the value of the R-Fund to drop by 50%. B-bank forgot to disclose to S that it 
had received kickback payments of 8% of the subscription amount from and that S therefore has a dam-
age claim against B-bank (which is true). Is this claim to be reduced due to contributory negligence? If 
yes, by how much should S’s claim be reduced (as a percentage)?
Case 3 “Source of Funds”: control condition
For years, inventor I worked on an invention allowing governments to cost-efficiently and environment-
friendly free oceans from plastic waste. This innovation is so good that he already earned 10 million 
Euros with it. I wants to invest 10% of the newly earned money into commodities fund R. After 
subscribing to the fund, vast precious metal sources are unexpectedly found in Siberia which leads to 
the value of ‘R fund’ shares to drop by 50%. It is revealed that B-bank forgot to disclose to I that it had 
received kickback payments of 8% of the subscription amount from and that I therefore has a damage 
claim against B-bank (which is true). Is this claim to be reduced due to contributory negligence? If yes, 
by how much should I’s claim be reduced (as a percentage)?
Case 3 “Source of Funds”: treatment condition
Recently, speculator S made a return of 10 million Euros with a new trading strategy. S wants to invest 
10% of the newly earned money into commodities fund R. After subscribing to the fund, vast precious 
metal sources are unexpectedly found in Siberia which leads to the value of ‘R fund’ shares to drop by 
50%. It is revealed that B-bank forgot to disclose to S that it had received kickback payments of 8% of 
the subscription amount from and that S therefore has a damage claim against B-bank (which is true). 
Is this claim to be reduced due to contributory negligence? If yes, by how much should S’s claim be 
reduced (as a percentage)?
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Table 4  Definitions of variables
Dependent variables
Contributory negligence: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant indicated that contributory negli-
gence should be awarded and 0 otherwise.
Explanatory variables
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